Décentralisation financière, fédéralisme et croissance: une approche par la qualité de gouvernance

Elsa Duret () and Bruno Ventelou

No 199908, Working Papers from CERDI

Abstract: This article examines how fiscal decentralization can help improve economic growth (assuming predatory governments). The calculation of the optimal level of regionalism involves a trade-off between the positive effect due to "proximity", and the negative effect linked to "coordination failures" (due to externalities, small independent regions fail to implement a sufficient level of public spending). Then, using a recent "Good Governance Measures" data base, we give consistent empirical evidence. Finally, the article shows that a super-center -which centralizes taxes and decentralizes spending- should achieve a better growth rate than the non coordinated solution featuring no center. In that way, "federalism" is the optimal rule.

Keywords: Externalities; Economic geography; Decentralization; Federalism; Predation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 1999
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Published in Revue d'Economie Régionale et Urbaine, 1999, pages 709-736
Published in Revue d'Economie Régionale et Urbaine

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdi:wpaper:107

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