EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

« Dé-privatisation » de la politique commerciale ? La mise en place du tarif extérieur commun de l’UEMOA

Bertrand Laporte

No 200203, Working Papers from CERDI

Abstract: Industrial lobbying has long been important in West African countries to induce government import-substitution policy. The objectives of governments were to defend infant industries and mobilise fiscal revenue. The doctrine, at a moment conflicting between World Bank and IMF, stopped the liberalisation included in the first structural adjustment programs. But during the 1990s, a consensus was born between the two institutions to support WAEMU regional integration. Although the WAEMU institutional organisation was unfavorable to decreasing protection, the support of the Washington Consensus and of the European Union has permitted trade policy de-privatisation through the application of Common External Tariff (CET). But the maintaining of different fiscal incentive systems in each country reduces the effectiveness of this new trade instrument (CET). The WAEMU Commission credibility depends on the fiscal incentive reforms which would allow an effective trade policy de-privatisation.

Keywords: Trade policy; Tariffs; Regional integration; Lobbying; WAEMU (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16
Date: 2002
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://publi.cerdi.org/ed/2002/2002.03.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://publi.cerdi.org/ed/2002/2002.03.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://publi.cerdi.org/ed/2002/2002.03.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdi:wpaper:168

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from CERDI Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Vincent Mazenod ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-03
Handle: RePEc:cdi:wpaper:168