Farmland Rental Values in GM Soybean Areas of Argentina: Do Contractual Arrangements Matter?

Johanna Choumert-Nkolo and Pascale Phelinas

No 201532, Working Papers from CERDI

Abstract: We study the determinants of rental prices of farmland in the Argentinean Pampas. In particular, we examine the value of lease contract characteristics within a hedonic price framework, while controlling for other potential sources of variation. Using first-hand data for 255 parcels, our results indicate that both short-term contracts and contracts with sowing pools push rental prices upwards. We also find that soybean yields have a significant impact on land rental rates. These results suggest that if Argentina intends to protect the enormous natural advantage it has for agricultural production, it should consider strictly regulating land rental contracts.

Keywords: Argentina; Hedonic price; Lease; Contracts; Soybean (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q13 Q15 R11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 2015-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr
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Related works:
Working Paper: Farmland rental values in GM soybean areas of Argentina: do contractual arrangements matter ? (2018)
Working Paper: Farmland Rental Values in GM Soybean Areas of Argentina: Do Contractual Arrangements Matter? (2015)
Working Paper: Farmland Rental Values in GM Soybean Areas of Argentina: Do Contractual Arrangements Matter? (2015)
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