Political monetary cycles and independence of the Central Bank in a monetary union: an empirical test for a BEAC Franc Zone member country

Seraphin Magloire Fouda ()

No 199612, Working Papers from CERDI

Abstract: This paper attempts to study the interactions between economic decisions and political motivations of incumbent Cameroonian governments from 1960 to 1992 within the framework of a political monetary cycle. It analyses the causes of such cycles and their consequences for the independence of the Central Bank of the monetary union to which Cameroon belongs.

Pages: 21
Date: 1996
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Published in Journal of African Economies, March 1997, pages 112-132
Published in Journal of African Economies

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdi:wpaper:18

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