Decentralization, spending efficiency and pro-poor outcomes in Morocco
Maria El khdari () and
No 201805, Working Papers from CERDI
This paper studies how decentralization affects poverty, vulnerability, and inequality in Morocco, in the context of ongoing regionalization reforms. We use different non-parametric approaches to assess spending efficiency of Moroccan municipalities and regions over the period 2005-2009. The results indicate that the efficiency of spending in improving pro-poor outcomes is dependent on the fiscal autonomy of subnational governments. While the impact of transfer dependency is not statistically significant, more granular data show that formula-based (unconditional) transfers significantly improve spending efficiency when the opposite is true for ad-hoc (conditional) transfers. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of political decentralization and find that local spending is less efficient in regions where municipal governments have a greater responsibility for spending compared to the regional government. This finding also holds in more fragmented regions with a high number of municipalities. Finally, we test whether there is an electoral budget cycle in Morocco and find that spending efficiency decreases the year of local elections, but increases with the level of education of elected officials.
Keywords: Decentralization; Morocco; Poverty; Vulnerability; Inequality; Public spending efficiency; Data envelopment analysis; Partial Frontier Analysis. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H7 C14 H5 C23 I3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-cdm, nep-dev and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Decentralization, spending efficiency and pro-poor outcomes in Morocco (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdi:wpaper:1919
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from CERDI Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Vincent Mazenod ().