Cooperation Breakdowns under Incomplete Property Rights

Jean Pierre Tranchant ()

No 200522, Working Papers from CERDI

Abstract: In order to analyze conflict and cooperation between a State and a non ruling group in a general equilibrium, I unite pure rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict under an assumption of property rights incompleteness. I show that a unique and globally stable Nash equilibrium exists in this game. Cooperation breakdowns appear to be twofold: either a generalized conflict driven by a collapse of the State or a one-sided rebellion due to coexistence between a strong State and a weak minority. Natural resources raise the rebellion cost supported by the ruler inducing this one to be more benevolent.

Keywords: Incomplete Property Rights; Rent-seeking; Redistribution; Civil Conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdi:wpaper:733

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