Land tenure insecurity and deforestation in the Brazilian Amazonia

Claudio Araujo, Catherine Araujo Bonjean (), Jean-Louis Combes, Pascale Combes Motel () and Eustaquio J. Reis ()
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Pascale Combes Motel: Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International(CERDI)
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Pascale Motel Combes ()

No 200615, Working Papers from CERDI

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of land tenure insecurity originating from land reforms on deforestation in the Brazilian Amazonia. A non cooperative game model is developed where natural forests are considered as an open access resource and the strategic interactions between landowners and squatters lead to an over deforestation. The main theoretical restriction is a positive impact of squatters on deforestation. It is successfully tested on a panel data set covering the municipalities of the Legal Amazonia controlling for the endogeneity of squatters in a deforestation equation. The result questions the modalities of the state-led land reform.

Keywords: Deforestation; Land reform; Land tenure insecurity; Panel estimation; Latin America; Brazil. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdi:wpaper:807

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