Corruption et mobilisation des recettes publiques: une analyse économétrique
Joseph Attila,
Jean-Louis Combes and
Gérard Chambas ()
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Gérard Chambas: Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International(CERDI)
No 200716, Working Papers from CERDI
Abstract:
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between corruption and public revenues. An empirical investigation of panel data (125 countries and covering the period 1980-2002) makes it possible not to reject the hypothesis that corruption has a negative effect on public revenues collection. However, the impact is different on the various components of revenue. This is because different rent opportunities are created by corruption which seems to modify public revenues structure in favour of customs tariffs revenues while reducing direct and indirect taxes such as VAT. It also appears that a major channel of corruption is the weakening of the tax morality which in this study is captured by various public service delivery variables.
Keywords: Corruption; Prelevement public; Donnees de panel (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Corruption et mobilisation des recettes publiques: une analyse économétrique (2011) 
Working Paper: Corruption et mobilisation des recettes publiques: une analyse économétrique (2011) 
Journal Article: Corruption et mobilisation des recettes publiques: une analyse économétrique (2009) 
Working Paper: Corruption et mobilisation des recettes publiques: une analyse économétrique (2009) 
Working Paper: Corruption et mobilisation des recettes publiques: une analyse économétrique (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdi:wpaper:912
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