Intraorganizational influence relations and the optimality of collective action

Pinhas Zusman and Gordon Rausser

Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series from Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley

Abstract: Collective action, though often superior to anarchy, tends to be socially suboptimal even when the proclivity of free riders to defect is fully controlled and an organization for collective action is set up. An effective organization for collective action involving many participants will likely feature a coordinating center and peripheral participants. Even if the overall group objective is fully internalized by the center, the organizational equilibrium is suboptimal as it reflects the influence of narrowly rational peripheral participants. The efficiency loss is particularly evident in collective action over time, where group choices even within a single generation are likely to be myopic-a propensity further exacerbated by the center's short planning horizon.

Keywords: cooperatives; decision-making; economics; equilibrium; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992-08-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/2w50308t.pdf;origin=repeccitec (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Intraorganizational influence relations and the optimality of collective action (1994)
Working Paper: Intraorganizational Influence Relations and the Optimality of Collective Action (1992)
Working Paper: Intraorganizational Influence Relations and the Optimality of Collective Action (1992)
Working Paper: Intraorganizational Influence Relations and the Optimality of Collective Action (1992)
Working Paper: Intraorganizational Influence Relations and the Optimality of Collective Action (1992)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt2w50308t

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series from Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lisa Schiff ().