An Open-Access Fishery with Rational Expectations

Peter Berck and Jeffrey Perloff

Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series from Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley

Abstract: How potential entrants to an open-access fishery form their expectations determines the fishery's adjustment path to a steady state but not the steady state values themselves. It is well known that, in the standard model with myopic expectations (those based on current values), boats enter the fishery only when the fish stock is greater than its steady state stock. We show that, with rational expectations (perfect foresight), however, boats may enter when the fish stock is much lower than its steady state value if the boat fleet is sufficiently small. This paper contrasts myopic and rational expectations within a general dynamic model of an open-access fishery.

Keywords: economic aspects; expectations; fisheries; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1982-12-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: An Open-Access Fishery with Rational Expectations (1984)
Working Paper: An Open-Access Fishery with Rational Expectations (1982)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:agrebk:qt876499mq

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