Defaults and Interest Rates in International Lending

Bhagwan Chowdhry

University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management from Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA

Abstract: Since lenders cannot observe the riskiness of the projects borrowers could choose, interest rates alone cannot be used as an instrument to discipline the borrowers. A credible threat to exclude borrowers who default more than a certain number of times from participating in the capital markets makes international debt contracts incentive compatible. Larger borrowers, since they get fewer chances to default, choose safer proejcts and are therefore charged smaller interest rates. Also, borrowers, after each successive default swtich to safer and safer projects which may result in smaller and smaller interest rates. This paper provides empirical evidence supporting these two predictions.

Date: 1991-08-01
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