The Essentiality Test for Patent Pools

Richard Gilbert

Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series from Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Abstract: Antitrust policy for the pooling of patents and other intellectual property rights has undergone a dramatic transformation since the first cases were decided at the beginning of the twentieth century. This transformation generally reflects developments in economics that provide a better understanding of the characteristics of patent pools that warrant antitrust scrutiny. The change, however, was slow, and the U.S. antitrust agencies did not clarify their enforcement principles with respect to patent pools until the publication by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission of Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights: Promoting Innovation and Competition, released in April 2007 (“IP Report”).1

Keywords: patents; antitrust; intellectual property; Federal Trade Commission; innovation; competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09-01
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