EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Vertical Integration in Gasoline Supply: An Empirical Test of Raising Rivals' Costs

Richard Gilbert and Justine Hastings

Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series from Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley

Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between the structure of the market for the refining and distribution of gasoline and the wholesale price of unbranded gasoline sold to independent gasoline retailers. Theoretically, the effect of an increase in vertical integration is ambiguous because opposing forces act to increase and decrease wholesale prices. We empirically examine the effects of vertical and horizontal market structures on wholesale prices using both a broad panel and an event analysis. The panel covers twenty-six metropolitan areas from January 1993 through June 1997. The event is a merger of Tosco and Unocal in 1997 that changed the vertical and horizontal structure of thirteen West Coast metropolitan areas. Both data sets show that an increase in the degree of vertical integration is associated with higher wholesale prices.

Keywords: vertical integration; oligopoly; market power; gasoline (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-06-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3b7101mj.pdf;origin=repeccitec (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Vertical Integration in Gasoline Supply: An Empirical Test of Raising Rivals' Costs (2002) Downloads
Working Paper: Vertical Integration in Gasoline Supply: An Empirical Test of Raising Rivals' Costs (2001) Downloads
Working Paper: Vertical Integration in Gasoline Supply: An Empirical Test of Raising Rivals' Costs (2001) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:compol:qt3b7101mj

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series from Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lisa Schiff ().

 
Page updated 2020-09-14
Handle: RePEc:cdl:compol:qt3b7101mj