EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

After Dodd-Frank: The Post-Enactment Politics of Financial Reform in the United States

J. Nicholas Ziegler and John T. Woolley

Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series from Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley

Abstract: [first revision] The financial crisis of 2008 raised the politics of regulation to a new level of practical as well as scholarly attention. This paper argues that the post - enactment politics of implementation matter as much to the success of regulatory reform as the politics of passing legislation. In contrast to the prevailing concepts of regulatory capture and business power, we find that recent reform s in U.S. financial markets hinge on intellectual resources and new organizational actors that are missing from existing theories of regulatory change. In particular, small advocacy groups have proven significantly more successful in opposing the financial - services industry than the existing literature predicts. By maintaining the salience of reform goals, elaboratiung new analytic frameworks, and deploying specialized expertise in post - enactment debates, these small organizations have contributed to a diffuse but often decisive network of pro - reform actors. Using empirical material from the rule - writing process for macroprudential supervision and for derivatives trading, we show that these small organizations coalesce with other groups to form a new stability alliance that has prevented industry groups from dominating financial regulation to the degree that occurred in earlier cases of regulatory reform.

Keywords: Social; and; Behavioral; Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/1651m00t.pdf;origin=repeccitec (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:indrel:qt1651m00t

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series from Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lisa Schiff ().

 
Page updated 2024-06-27
Handle: RePEc:cdl:indrel:qt1651m00t