Property Rights, Mobile Capital, and Comparative Advantage

Larry Karp

Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series from Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley

Abstract: Recent papers show that imperfect property rights to a natural resource--a sector-specific factor--can be a source of comparative advantage. in these models, weaker property rights attract labor--the only mobile factor--to the resource sector, increasing the country's comparative advantage for that sector. If capital in addition to labor is mobile, and if the benefits of capital are non-excludable or if the degree of property rights is endogenous, a deterioration of property rights has ambiguous effects on comparative advantage and on the equilibrium wage-rental ratio.

Keywords: JEL F02; F16; D23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-06-07
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Related works:
Journal Article: Property rights, mobile capital, and comparative advantage (2005)
Working Paper: Property rights, mobile capital, and comparative advantage (2005)
Working Paper: Property Rights, Mobile Capital, and Comparative Advantage (2004)
Working Paper: Property Rights, Mobile Capital, and Comparative Advantage (2003)
Working Paper: Property rights, mobile capital, and comparative advantage (2003)
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