Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements

Federico Echenique and Aaron S. Edlin

Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series from Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics

Abstract: In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria - equilibria that are not in pure strategies - are unstable for broad class of learning dynamics.

Date: 2004-10-16
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Journal Article: Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements (2004)
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