Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements

Federico Echenique and Aaron S. Edlin

Berkeley Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper Series from Berkeley Program in Law and Economics

Abstract: In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria - equilibria that are not in pure strategies - are unstable for broad class of learning dynamics.

Date: 2004-10-16
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Journal Article: Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements (2004)
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