Government Accountability and Fiscal Discipline: A panel analysis using Swiss data

Christoph Schaltegger and Benno Torgler

Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series from Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics

Abstract: Government accountability through electoral engagement, involvement and participation in the political debate can affect government performance. Using data for the full sample of Swiss cantons over the 1981–2001 period, this paper provides empirical evidence that government accountability is crucial for fiscal discipline. Specifically, in cantons with high levels of government accountability, the level of indebtedness is significantly lower, indicating that accountability supports fiscal discipline. To obtain a useful approximation for government accountability between citizens and their representatives, we use information from direct voter participation in political decisions (initiatives and public referenda) in Swiss state (cantonal) governments. Electoral support of government proposals reveals an important aspect of accountability in a real world setting.

Keywords: Z130; H110; O170; D720; E620 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-12-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/1jc275p2.pdf;origin=repeccitec (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Government accountability and fiscal discipline: A panel analysis using Swiss data (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:oplwec:qt1jc275p2

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series from Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lisa Schiff ().