Environmental Remedies: An Incomplete Information Aggregation Game
Leo Simon () and
Jinhua Zhao ()
Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series from Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics
The burden of resolving an environmental problem is typically shared among several responsible parties. To clarify the nature and extent of the problem, these parties must provide information to the regulator. Based on this information, the regulator will instigate an investigation of the problem, to determine an appropriate remedy. This paper investigates the incentives facing agents to promote excessive investigation and postpone remediation. Our incomplete information game-theoretic model may be of general interest to game theorists: we apply a new theorem guaranteeing pure-strategy equilibria and introduce a class of games called " aggregation games" which have interesting properties and are widely applicable.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:oplwec:qt9z00731z
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series from Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lisa Schiff ().