Asymmetric Federalism in India

Govinda Rao and Nirvikar Singh

Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series from Center for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz

Abstract: The focus of this paper is unequal arrangements and special treatment for some units within Indian federalism, namely. We first explore the conceptual issues – the causes and consequences of asymmetric federalism. Next, we trace the evolution of Indian federalism and analyze the factors contributing to the asymmetric arrangements in political, administrative and fiscal relations. We bring out asymmetric arrangements arising from constitutional arrangements or conventions evolved over the years. Recent political developments and asymmetric treatment due to administrative and political exigencies are also analyzed.

Keywords: intergovernmental transfers; federalism; political bargaining; constitutional arrangements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-04-01
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/4370m6p1.pdf;origin=repeccitec (application/pdf)

Related works:
Chapter: Asymmetric Federalism in India (2007)
Working Paper: Asymmetric Federalism in India (2004)
Working Paper: Asymmetric Federalism in India (2004)
Working Paper: Asymmetric federalism in India (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:scciec:qt4370m6p1

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series from Center for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lisa Schiff ().