Separating the Hawks from the Doves ∗

Keith J. Henwood, Daniel Friedman and Ryan Oprea

Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz

Abstract: Human players in our laboratory experiment converge closely to the symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium when matched in a single population version of the standard Hawk-Dove game. When matched across two populations, the same players show clear movement towards an asymmetric (and very inequitable) pure Nash equilibrium of the same game. These findings support a distinctive prediction of evolutionary game theory.

Keywords: Evolutionary dynamics; Hawk-Dove game; game theory; laboratory experiment; continuous time game. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09-22
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