Boundedly rational versus optimization-based models of strategic thinking and learning in games

Vp Crawford

University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC San Diego

Abstract: The paper is a comment on the article by R. Harstad and R. Selten and considers the tradeoff between bounded rationality and optimization models in the game-theoretic context. The author shows that in most of the models elements of opimization are still retained and that it is thus more productive to further improve the optimization-based modeling rather than to abandon them altogether in favour of bounded rationality.

Date: 2014-01-01
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