Evidence Disclosure and Verfiability

Jesse Bull () and Joel Watson

University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC San Diego

Abstract: We explore the notion of "verifiability" by analyzing a simple model of evidence production in contractual relationships with complete information. We characterize implementability in terms of the existence and form of "hard evidence." We provide results on maximal and minimal evidence production that are, respectively, necessary and sufficient for implementation. We briefly discuss the relevance of our results to actual legal institutions.

Keywords: verifiability; contracts; evidence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-09-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Evidence disclosure and verifiability (2004)
Working Paper: Evidence Disclosure and Verifiability (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt19p7z2gm

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