Jobs, Jobs, Jobs: A New Perspective on Protectionism

Arnaud Costenot

University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC San Diego

Abstract: This paper analyzes the determinants of protectionism in a small open economy with search frictions a la PISSARIDES (2000). In equilibrium, jobs generate rents in each sector. Like in the Ricardo-Viner model, the magnitude of those rents may depend on the level of trade protection. The distinct feature of our model is that trade protection may also affect the access to those rents. By raising the domestic price of a given good, a government may attract more firms in a given industry. This raises the probability that a worker will find a job in this sector, and in turn, will benefit from the associated rents. Though simple, our model may help explain a variety of stylized facts regarding the structure of trade protection and individual trade-policy preferences.

Keywords: search frictions; trade protection; trade-policy preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-07-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/1bt8n04n.pdf;origin=repeccitec (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt1bt8n04n

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC San Diego Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lisa Schiff ().