Manipulation of Preferences and Relative Utilitarianism

Joel Sobel

University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC San Diego

Abstract: Given n agents with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions who wish to divide m commodities, consider the n-person noncooperative game with strategies consisting of concave, increasing von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, and whose outcomes are the relative utilitarian solution. It is shown that any constrained equal-income competitive equilibrium allocation for the true utilities is a Nash equilibrium outcome for the noncooperative game. Conditions are presented under which these are the only pure strategy equilibrium outcomes.

Keywords: utility; functions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-07-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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