An Active-Contracting Perspective on Equilibrium Selection in Relational Contracts

David A Miller and Joel Watson

University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC San Diego

Keywords: Economics; Applied Economics; Economic Theory; equilibrium selection; active contracting; bargaining power; relationships; Applied economics; Economic theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-01-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eur, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: An Active-Contracting Perspective on Equilibrium Selection in Relational Contracts (2023)
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