Getting Permission When Options Are Partially Ordered

Peicong Hu and Joel Sobel

University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC San Diego

Abstract: A manager has access to expert advisers. The manager selects at most one project and can implement it only if one expert provides support. The game in which the manager consults experts simultaneously typically has multiple equilibria including one in which at least one expert supports the manager’s favorite project. We describe the set of outcomes that survive iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies. These outcomes typically exclude the manager’s most preferred equilibrium outcome. We introduce sequential procedures and compare their performance to the simultaneous game. In general, sequential consultation may be superior or inferior to simultaneous consultation.

Keywords: 38 Economics (for-2020); 3801 Applied Economics (for-2020); 3803 Economic Theory (for-2020) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-01-01
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