Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design

Joel Watson and Jesse Bull ()

University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC San Diego

Abstract: This paper addresses how hard evidence can be incorporated intomechanismdesign analysis. Two classes of models are compared: (a) ones in which evidentiary decisions are accounted for explicitly, and (b) ones in which the players make abstract declarations of their types. Conditions are provided under which versions of these models are equivalent. The paper also addresses whether dynamic mechanisms are required for Nash implementation in settings with hard evidence. The paper shows that static mechanisms suffice in the setting of “evidentiary normality” and that, in a more general environment, one can restrict attention to a class of three-stage dynamic mechanisms.

Keywords: contract; mechanism design; hard evidence; verifiability; revelation principle; static mechanisms; dynamic mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-02-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/7973v805.pdf;origin=repeccitec (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Hard evidence and mechanism design (2007)
Working Paper: Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design (2004)
Working Paper: Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt7973v805

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