Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete and Sophistication in Experimental “Hide and Seek” Games

Vincent Crawford and Nagore Iriberri

University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC San Diego

Abstract: "Hide-and-Seek" games are zero-sum two-person games in which one player wins by matching the other's decision and the other wins by mismatching. Although such games are often played on cultural or geographic "landscapes" that frame decisions non-neutrally, equilibrium ignores such framing. This paper reconsiders the results of experiments by Rubinstein, Tversky, and others whose designs model non-neutral landscapes, in which subjects deviated systematically from equilibrium in response to them. Comparing alternative explanations theoretically and econometrically suggests that the deviations are best explained by a structural non-equilibrium model of initial responses based on "level-k" thinking, suitably adapted to non-neutral landscapes.

Keywords: behavioral game theory; experiments; hide-and-seek games; framing effects; salience; bounded rationality; level-k thinking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games (2006)
Working Paper: Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games (2005)
Working Paper: Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games (2004)
Working Paper: Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games (2004)
Working Paper: Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games (2004)
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