Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes

Amihai Glazer

University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers from University of California Transportation Center

Abstract: A linear tax on an externality-generating activity may not attain the first-best social optimum. The problem arises because a monopolist’s gain from improving the characteristics of a product may differ from the social gain, even when consumers are willing to pay for the change.

Keywords: Regulation; Externalities; Taxes; Social and Behavioral Sciences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes (1997)
Working Paper: Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes (1997)
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