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Crítica à avaliação quantitativa do efeito unilateral de um ato de concentração

Marina Moreira da Gama and Marco Antonio Cavalieri
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Marina Moreira da Gama: Cedeplar-UFMG

Textos para Discussão Cedeplar-UFMG from Cedeplar, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais

Abstract: The paper’s purpose is to investigate and to criticize the quantitative method used by antitrust authorities to analyze mergers unilateral effects. Until the nineties the method used by antitrust authorities was discretionary, based on a structural analysis of the market or the relevant market delimitation and the possibility of market power. Recently, the antitrust authorities have implemented a new method, called ‘merger simulation’ or the use of an oligopoly model with a demand system that predict the post merger prices and outputs. The problems with this new method are that two: these inherent implications, such that i) the dependence on the inherent curvature properties of the demand system; ii) the assumption that marginal cost does not vary in the relevant range; iii) the simplicity of the static oligopoly model; iv) the absence of market structural change as a consequence of the merger; and the relationship that this new method made with the variables structure and performance, like the questionable structuralism theory.

Keywords: merger; unilateral effects; merger simulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L40 L44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2006-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
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https://www.cedeplar.ufmg.br/pesquisas/td/TD%20295.pdf (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: CRÍTICA À AVALIAÇÃO QUANTITATIVA DO EFEITO UNILATERAL DE UM ATO DE CONCENTRAÇÃO (2006) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdp:texdis:td295

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