Absolute Expediency and Imitative Behaviour

Antonio Morales ()

No E2002/03, Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces from Centro de Estudios Andaluces

Abstract: This paper analyses a model of learning by imitation, where besides the decision maker, there is a population of individuals facing the same decision problem. We analyze a property called Absolute Expediency, which requires that the decision maker's expected payoff increases from one round to the next for every decision problem and every state of the population. We give a simple characterization of the expediency property and show that its basic feature is proportional imitation: the change in the probability attached to the played action is proportional to the difference between the received and the sampled payoff (the sampled payoff plays the role of an aspiration level).

Keywords: Social Learning; Decision Problems; Imitation; Bounded Rationality. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C79 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2002-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cea:doctra:e2002_03

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