Provisión eficiente de inversión pública financiada con impuestos distorsionantes

José Manuel González-Páramo () and Diego Martínez
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José Manuel González-Páramo: Universidad Complutense de Madrid

No E2002/08, Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces from Centro de Estudios Andaluces

Abstract: In this paper we provide a simple general equilibrium model with public investment and distorting taxes. First, we obtain the optimality conditions for public investment provision under different tax systems. Also we discuss whether tax revenue is increased by the complementary between productive public spending and taxed goods, ceteris paribus. Second, a more restrictive framework for government is presented: tax rates are fixed ex ante. This case is simulated numerically and we find some interesting consequences on public investment levels, total and marginal cost of public funds and tax revenue.

Keywords: Infrastructures; taxes; efficiency; social welfare. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 H41 H54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 38 pages
Date: 2002
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cea:doctra:e2002_08

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