The Scoring Rules in an Endogenous Election

Bernardo Moreno () and M. Socorro Puy

No E2003/26, Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces from Centro de Estudios Andaluces

Abstract: Plurality rule, when applied to a fixed agenda setting, is mostly criticized from being capable of choosing an alternative considered as worst by a strict majority. In this paper we consider an endogenous agenda setting with no more than three alternatives. In those equilibria where the Condorcet winner enters the contest, we show, in direct contrast to the fixed agenda case, that Plurality rule is the only scoring rule which always elects the Condorcet winner.

Keywords: Scoring rules; Citizen-candidate; Condorcet Consistency; Strategic candidacy. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: The scoring rules in an endogenous election (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cea:doctra:e2003_26

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