Poverty in Dictator Games: Awakening Solidarity
Pablo Brañas-Garza
No E2003/50, Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces from Centro de Estudios Andaluces
Abstract:
This paper investigates the effect of poverty and good intentions on dictator game giving. Previous experimental studies in which information was supplied to dictators about recipients have shown that dictator giving increases overall in this context. We develop a new design of standard informed dictator games with three main variants: 1) three recipients are used instead of one; 2) dictators are informed that their recipients are poor; 3) dictators give donations in the form of medicines instead of money. We have found that 46% of the experimental subjects (dictators) give the full amount of money (100% of the endowment) in the “poverty” treatment, while in the “medicines” treatment this percentage increases to 72%. Such extremely generous behavior has seldom been observed in the previous literature on dictator games.
Keywords: dictator giving; poverty effect; good intentions effect; medicines. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 C91 D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Poverty in dictator games: Awakening solidarity (2006) 
Working Paper: Poverty in Dictator Games: Awakening Solidarity (2003) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cea:doctra:e2003_50
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