Strategic Uncertainty and Risk Attitudes:"The Experimental Connection"

Pablo Brañas-Garza, Francisca Jiménez Jiménez () and Antonio Morales ()
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Francisca Jiménez Jiménez: Universidad de Jaén., http://www.ujaen.es

No E2004/12, Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces from Centro de Estudios Andaluces

Abstract: In this paper we obtain empirical evidence of the relationship between individuals' risk attitudes and individuals' beliefs on their rival's choices in the Prisoners' Dilemma game. We find that (i) Risk-averse subjects seem to think that their opponent will defect, (ii) Risk-loving individuals tend to think that their opponent will cooperate with higher probabilities, and (iii) finally, those subjects who believe that the rival will behave rationally are more risk averse than those subjects that believe that the rival will make a mistake, who on average are risk neutral.

Keywords: Expected utility theory; Risk attitudes; Strategic risk; Prisoners' Dilemma. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C91 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cea:doctra:e2004_12

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