A Model of Political Campaign Manipulation
Pablo Amoros and
M. Socorro Puy
No E2004/20, Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces from Centro de Estudios Andaluces
Abstract:
We propose a multidimensional spatial model of political competition where the advertising campaign aims at influencing the weights that voters’ preferences assign to different political issues. The campaign strategies will move the vote of those voters who lack of partisan identification. The equilibrium analysis of the proposed electoral game yields insights into the chances that the ex-ante loser political party has of winning the elections when there is electoral campaign. We show that the ex-ante loser can end up winning the elections even when (1) it has less campaign funds than its opponent and, (2) it has no advantage on any single political issue.
Keywords: Election campaign; political issues; preferences manipulation; positional voting. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cea:doctra:e2004_20
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