Union Games: Technological Unemployment

Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba () and Emma Moreno-García
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Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba: Universidad de Salamanca, Universidad Nacional de Colombia
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Gonzalo Fernandez-de-Cordoba

No E2004/45, Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces from Centro de Estudios Andaluces

Abstract: Given a production economy, we define a trade union game by considering strategic behavior on factor supplies. We refer to the Nash equilibria of this game as trade union equilibria. First we analyze situations under which unemployment of factors are supported as trade union equilibria. The degree of unemployment depends on technological conditions. In this line, we suggest a source of unemployment which differs from the usual sources provided in the related literature. Then, we state a limit result which shows that when the market power of trade unions decreases the corresponding sequence of trade union equilibria converges to the walrasian equilibrium, that is, to full employment of factors.

Keywords: Trade Union Games; unemployment; walrasian equilibrium; manipulability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2004
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Journal Article: Union games: technological unemployment (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cea:doctra:e2004_45

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