A note on a value with incomplete communication

Jesús Bilbao (), Nieves Jiménez () and Jorge Jesús López ()
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Nieves Jiménez: Universidad de Sevilla, http://investigacion.us.es/sisius/sis_showpub.php?idpers=1177
Jorge Jesús López: Universidad de Sevilla, http://investigacion.us.es/sisius/sis_showpub.php?idpers=1179

No E2004/55, Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces from Centro de Estudios Andaluces

Abstract: The Myerson's models on partial cooperation in cooperative games have been studied extensively by Borm, Owen, Tijs and Myerson. Hamiache proposes a new solution concept for the case in which the communication relations among players are modelled by means of an undirected graph. In this work, we analize this value making some vagueness clear, generalize this value to other models of partial cooperation emphasizing the differences in the generalization and we include some comparative calculations of this value with the Myerson value and the position value.

Keywords: Cooperative game; Myerson value; position value; consistency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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