The Shapley value for bicooperative games

Jesús Bilbao (), Julio R. Fernández (), Nieves Jiménez () and Jorge Jesús López ()
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Julio R. Fernández: Universidad de Sevilla, http://investigacion.us.es/sisius/sis_showpub.php?idpers=337
Nieves Jiménez: Universidad de Sevilla, http://investigacion.us.es/sisius/sis_showpub.php?idpers=1177
Jorge Jesús López: Universidad de Sevilla, http://investigacion.us.es/sisius/sis_showpub.php?idpers=1179

No E2004/56, Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces from Centro de Estudios Andaluces

Abstract: The aim of the present paper is to study a one-point solution concept for bicooperative games. For these games introduced by Bilbao (2000), we define a one-point solution called the Shapley value, since this value can be interpreted in a similar way to the classical Shapley value for cooperative games. The main result of the paper is an axiomatic characterization of this value.

Keywords: Bicooperative games; Shapley value. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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