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How politicians make decisions under risk: a political choice experiment

Enrique Fatas (), Tibor Neugebauer and Pilar Tamborero ()
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Pilar Tamborero: Universitat de Valencia

No E2004/58, Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces from Centro de Estudios Andaluces

Abstract: We report on an experimental study with real-world politicians. These political experts face political choice problems under risk and probability. Thus, we test the frequently observed violations of rational choice theory -the reference point effect, loss aversion, framing effects, and the common ratio effect- with experts from the field. Their choices violate expected utility theory. Nevertheless, they appear to be more rational and less risk averse (loving) in the domain of gains (losses) than student subjects.

Keywords: Subject-pool effect; experts; expected utility; prospect theory. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2004
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-lam and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cea:doctra:e2004_58

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