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Strategy-Proof Coalition Formation

Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez ()

No E2006/11, Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces from Centro de Estudios Andaluces

Abstract: We analyze coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned into coalitions and agents' preferences only depend on the coalition they belong to. We study rules that associate to each profile of agents' preferences a partition of the society. We focus on strategy-proof rules on restricted domains of preferences, as the domains of additively representable or separable preferences. In such domains, the only strategy-proof and individually rational rules that satisfy either Pareto efficiency or non-bossiness and flexibility are single-lapping rules. Single-lapping rules are characterized by severe restrictions on the set of feasible coalitions that are consisitent with hierarchical organizations. These restrictions are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a unique core-stable partition. This fact implies that single-lapping rules always select the associated unique core-stable partition. Thus, our results highlight the relation between the non-cooperative concept of strategy-proofness and the cooperative concept of uniqueness of core-stable partitions.

Keywords: Coalition Formation; Strategy-Proofness; Single-Lapping Property; Core-Stability; Matching Problems. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cse and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategy-proof coalition formation (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: Strategy-proof coalition formation (2005) Downloads
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