Signaling in Political Cycles. How far are you willing to go?

Jorge Streb ()

No 193, CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. from Universidad del CEMA

Abstract: Previous results on political cycles as a signal of competency assumed that opportunism was common knowledge. If opportunism is not common knowledge, there may be a partially pooling equilibrium where cycles indicate opportunism rather than competency. Insofar as more discretionality increases the asymmetry of information, the possibility of cycles increases, and elections may become less effective to select competent incumbents.

Keywords: rational political budget cycles; two-dimensional asymmetric information; signaling; adverse selection; visibility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 E6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-07
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://www.ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/documentos/193.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Signaling in Political Budget Cycles: How Far Are You Willing to Go? (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cem:doctra:193

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