Opaque governance, special purpose vehicles, and the preacher´s waiver

Rodolfo Apreda

No 481, CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. from Universidad del CEMA

Abstract: This paper argues that special purpose vehicles, SPVs, are two-edged financial constructs whose bad edge consists in conveying opaque governance, whereas its good one amounts to interesting financial engineering. Firstly, the notion of opaque governance is highlighted, to focus next on SPVs and their governance. Afterwards, the paper delves into collateralized debt obligations and their facilitators, the offshore locations. Last, the failing role of some regulators and gatekeepers is emphasized with the purpose of setting up new measures to prevent them from claiming the Preacher’s waiver.

Keywords: opaque governance; special purpose vehicles; collateralized debt obligations; offshore locations; gatekeepers; regulators (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G15 G21 G24 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2012-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cem:doctra:481

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