 Parent-Child Bargaining, Parental Transfers, and the Postsecondary Education DecisionWorking Papers from U.S. Census Bureau, Center for Economic Studies Abstract: Economic models of schooling decisions are largely unitary preference in nature. They ignore parent-child conflict, with parents often acting as the sole decisionmaker. In this paper, a theoretical model is formulated in which parents and child participate in cooperative bargaining as a means of resolving disagreements. The model’s implications are compared to those of the unitary preference model, motivating tests of parental altruism and income pooling. Reduced form equations for years of postsecondary schooling and transfers are estimated, both for the full sample and for subsamples defined by type of disagreement, using student-level data from the National Center for Education Statistics’ High School and Beyond Surveys. While income pooling is rejected only for the group of students who prefer more schooling than their parents, parental altruism is rejected for all groups. A major finding is that parent-child disagreement is an important determinant of the level of financial support parents provide. Keywords: CES; economic; research; micro; data; microdata; chief; economist (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cen:wpaper:02-13 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Working Papers from U.S. Census Bureau, Center for Economic Studies Contact information at EDIRC. |
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