Are All Trade Protection Policies Created Equal? Empirical Evidence for Nonequivalent Market Power Effects of Tariffs and Quotas
Justin Pierce () and
Wesley Wilson ()
Working Papers from U.S. Census Bureau, Center for Economic Studies
The steel industry has been protected by a wide variety of trade policies, both tariff- and quota-based, over the past decades. This extensive heterogeneity in trade protection provides the opportunity to examine the well-established theoretical literature predicting nonequivalent effects of tariffs and quotas on domestic firms' market power. Robust to a variety of empirical specifications with U.S. Census data on the population of U.S. steel plants from 1967-2002, we find evidence for significant market power effects for binding quota-based protection, but not for tariff-based protection. There is only weak evidence that antidumping protection increases market power.
Keywords: Market structure; Nonequivalence of tariffs and quotas; VRAs; Antidumping; Mini-mills (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F23 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-reg
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https://www2.census.gov/ces/wp/2010/CES-WP-10-27.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Are all trade protection policies created equal? Empirical evidence for nonequivalent market power effects of tariffs and quotas (2013)
Working Paper: Are All Trade Protection Policies Created Equal? Empirical Evidence for Nonequivalent Market Power Effects of Tariffs and Quotas (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cen:wpaper:10-27
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