The dilemma of central bank transparency

Stephen Hansen, Michael McMahon and Andrea Prat

CentrePiece - The magazine for economic performance from Centre for Economic Performance, LSE

Abstract: If central banks publish the transcripts of their internal policy debates, will discussions be enhanced or inhibited? Michael McMahon and colleagues use tools from computational linguistics to analyse the positive and negative effects of transparency on deliberations of the monetary policymakers at the US Federal Reserve.

Keywords: Monetary policy; deliberation; FOMC; transparency; career concerns (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:cepcnp:439

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