 Does Social Insurance Help Secure Property Rights?STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE Abstract: This paper develops a simple model to show how social insurance affects the desire to revolt against property rights. It then tests for the effect of social insurance on revolt by introducing a panel data set derived from surveys across 200,000 randomly sampled individuals from the 1970s to the 1990s. After controlling for the personal characteristics of respondents, country fixed effects, year dummies, as well as country-specific time trends, fewer people are found to support revolt when the generosity of either the elderly person's social security or unemployment benefits increases. A one standard deviation change in either variable explains approximately one standard deviation of the proportion of people supporting revolt, measured across the countries and years in the sample. The personal characteristic with the largest effect on reducing revolutionary support is being religious. Keywords: Social Insrance; Property Rights; Revolt. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stidep:31 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE |
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