Second-Hand Markets and Collusion byManufacturers of Semidurable Goods

Pasquale Schiraldi ()

STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: The focus of the present work is to study the impact of the second-hand market the collusivebehavior. I analyze firms' preferences for having an active second-hand market and whetherpolicies (i.e. leasing policy, buy-back policy and warranty policy) that affect the functioningof the second-hand market strengthen collusion. I show how collective incentives to adoptstrategies that strengthen collusion often differ from monopoly incentives to achieve higherprofits.

Keywords: Bertrand competition; buy-back policies; collusion; leasing; semi-durability; second-hand market; warranty. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D43 L11 L13 L25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09
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https://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/ei/ei48.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Second-Hand Markets and Collusion by Manufacturers of Semidurable Goods (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stieip:48

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