Can Market Failure Cause Political Failure?
Aney Madhav S,
Maitreesh Ghatak () and
STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE
We study how inefficiencies of market failure may be further amplified by political choices made by interest groups created in the inefficient market. We take an occupational choice framework, where agents are endowed heterogeneously with wealth and talent. In our model, market failure due to unobservability of talent endogenously creates a class structure that affects voting on institutional reform. In contrast to the world without market failure where the electorate unanimously vote in favour of surplus maximising institutional reform, we find that the preferences of these classes are often aligned in ways that creates a tension between surplus maximising and politically feasible institutional reforms.
Keywords: occupational choice; adverse selection; property rights; assetliquidation; political failure; market failure. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O12 O16 O17 I (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Working Paper: Can Market Failure Cause Political Failure? (2013)
Working Paper: Can Market Failure Cause Political Failure (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stieop:029
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