Can Workfare Programs Moderate Violence? Evidence from India

Thiemo Fetzer

STICERD - Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: Governments in conflict torn states scramble for effective policies to persistently reduce levels of violence. This paper provides evidence that a workfare program that functions as a social insurance, providing employment opportunities in times of need, may be an effective antidote to shut down an important mechanism that drives conflict. By mitigating adverse income shocks, the Indian National Rural Employment Guarantee scheme has been successful in removing the income dependence of insurgency violence and thus, contributes to persistently lower levels of violence.

Keywords: social insurance; conflict; India; insurgency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 J65 Q34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (70)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stieop:053

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